[Colloq] REMINDER: Talk - Memory Corruption: Why Protection is Hard - Mathias Payer - Today, Friday, Oct 23rd, 1:30-2:30pm, WVH 366

Walker, Lashauna la.walker at neu.edu
Fri Oct 23 10:57:00 EDT 2015


Title: Memory Corruption: why protection is hard
Speaker: Mathias Payer
Date: Friday, October 23rd
Time: 1:30-2:30pm

Location: 366 WVH

Abstract:
Memory corruption plagues systems since the dawn of computing. With the
rise of defense techniques like stack cookies, ASLR, and DEP, attacks
have become much more complicated, yet control-flow hijack attacks are
still prevalent. Attacks leverage code reuse attacks, often using some
form of information disclosure. Stronger defense mechanisms have been
proposed but none have seen wide deployment so far (i) due to the time
it takes to deploy a security mechanism, (ii) incompatibility with
specific features, and (iii) most severely due to performance overhead.
In the talk, we evaluate the security benefits and limitations of the
status quo and look into upcoming defense mechanisms (and their attacks).

Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) and Code-Pointer Integrity (CPI) are two of
the hottest upcoming defense mechanisms. CFI guarantees that the runtime
control flow follows the statically determined control-flow graph. An
attacker may reuse any of the valid transitions at any control flow
transfer. CPI on the other hand is a dynamic property that enforces
memory safety guarantees like bounds checks for code pointers by
separating code pointers from regular data. We will discuss differences
and advantages/disadvantages of both approaches, especially the security
benefits they give under novel attacks like Counterfeit Object-Oriented
Programming (COOP) and Control-Flow Bending (CFB).  COOP reuses complete
functions as gadgets and CFB bends the control flow along valid but
unintended paths in the control-flow graph of a program.

Bio:
Mathias Payer is a security researcher and an assistant professor in
computer science at Purdue university. His interests are related to
system security, binary exploitation, user-space software-based fault
isolation, binary translation/recompilation, and (application)
virtualization. His research focuses on protecting applications even in
the presence of vulnerabilities, with a focus on memory corruption.
Before joining Purdue in 2014 he spent two years as PostDoc in Dawn
Song's BitBlaze group at UC Berkeley. He graduated from ETH Zurich with
a Dr. sc. ETH in 2012.


Thank You.

LaShauna Walker
Executive Assistant to Dean Carla Brodley
College of Computer and Information Science
Northeastern University
617-373-5204
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