[PRL] Fwd: Fwd: [Colloq] Distinguished Speaker Series, January 31 - Silvio Micali, MIT

Mitchell Wand wand at ccs.neu.edu
Tue Jan 30 22:29:09 EST 2007


I second this motion.  --Mitch

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Ravi Sundaram <koods at ccs.neu.edu>
Date: Jan 30, 2007 7:35 PM
Subject: Fwd: Fwd: [Colloq] Distinguished Speaker Series, January 31 -
Silvio Micali, MIT
To: faculty at ccs.neu.edu, grads at ccs.neu.edu

Please do try and attend the Distinguished Speaker Series talks (there is
one tomorrow at noon) - this is important both to hear about the big issues
in computing and also to project to our distinguished speakers that we are
an engaged and vibrant community.

thanks
--ravi


        ------  Original Message  ------
Subject: [Colloq] Distinguished Speaker Series, January 31 - Silvio Micali,
MIT
To:      colloq at lists.ccs.neu.edu
From:    Rachel Kalweit <rachelb at ccs.neu.edu>
Date:    Tue, 23 Jan 2007 13:50:01 -0500




College of Computer and Information Science Colloquium
Distinguished Speaker Series

Wednesday, January 31, 2007
12:00pm
20 West Village F

Speaker:
Silvio Micali
MIT

Title:
"Transparent Achievement of Correlated Equilibrium"

Bio:
SILVIO MICALI received his Ph.D. in Computer Science from the University
of California at Berkeley in 1982. He is Professor of Computer Science
in the MIT Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
since '83 and a member of the Cryptography and Information Security
Group of the MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory.
Founder of the Algorithmic Theory of Pseudorandom and co-inventor of
Zero Knowledge Proofs, Professor Micali is interested in cryptography,
secure protocols and their applications to Electronic Commerce.
Professor Micali holds the Gödel Prize in Theoretical Computer Science.

"Transparent Achievement of Correlated Equilibrium" Abstract:
As introduced by Aumann, correlated equilibrium is a powerful game
theoretic NOTION, generalizing that of Nash equilibrium with significant
advantages. REACHING correlated equilibrium, however, has proved quite
problematic, both conceptually and algorithmically.

We put forward a new and compelling notion of reaching correlated
equilibrium, and show that it is always and efficiently attainable via
ballots and a ballot-randomizing device.

(Joint work with Izmalkov, Lepinski and Shelat)





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